Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

The utilization bound of non-preemptive rate-monotonic scheduling in controller area networks is 25%

Consider a distributed computer system comprising many computer nodes, each interconnected with a controller area network (CAN) bus. We prove that if priorities to message streams are assigned using rate-monotonic (RM) and if the requested capacity of the CAN bus does not exceed 25% then all deadlines are met.

Exact analysis of TDMA with slot skipping

Consider a communication medium shared among a set of computer nodes; these computer nodes issue messages that are requested to be transmitted and they must finish their transmission before their respective deadlines. TDMA/SS is a protocol that solves this problem; it is a specific type of Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) where a computer node is allowed to skip its time slot and then this time slot can be used by another computer node. We present an algorithm that computes exact queuing times for TDMA/SS in conjunction with Rate-Monotonic (RM) or Earliest- Deadline-First (EDF).

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Two-production-period in a duopoly with nonprofit and for-profit firms

We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We find that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the follower exist; however, another tackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the leader does not exist.

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.

Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also higher in the mixed market, and, thus, environmental tax rate in the mixed duopoly is higher than that in the privatized duopoly. Furthermore, the environment is more damaged in the mixed than in the private market. The overall effect on the social welfare is that it will becomes higher in the private than in the mixed market.

Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Efficient schedulability tests for real-time embedded systems with urgent routines

Task scheduling is one of the key mechanisms to ensure timeliness in embedded real-time systems. Such systems have often the need to execute not only application tasks but also some urgent routines (e.g. error-detection actions, consistency checkers, interrupt handlers) with minimum latency. Although fixed-priority schedulers such as Rate-Monotonic (RM) are in line with this need, they usually make a low processor utilization available to the system. Moreover, this availability usually decreases with the number of considered tasks. If dynamic-priority schedulers such as Earliest Deadline First (EDF) are applied instead, high system utilization can be guaranteed but the minimum latency for executing urgent routines may not be ensured. In this paper we describe a scheduling model according to which urgent routines are executed at the highest priority level and all other system tasks are scheduled by EDF. We show that the guaranteed processor utilization for the assumed scheduling model is at least as high as the one provided by RM for two tasks, namely 2(2√−1). Seven polynomial time tests for checking the system timeliness are derived and proved correct. The proposed tests are compared against each other and to an exact but exponential running time test.